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 Abstract 
The conflict in Afghanistan is over a decade long, yet the literature surrounding the 
strategies of the Taliban is distinctly lacking. A few scholars, analysts and former military 
personnel have dedicated chapters or articles to various Taliban strategies, however, a lot of 
the information appears in a diffuse state or has rapidly become outdated with the 
contemporary nature of the conflict. This project will therefore address two of the Taliban’s 
most important strategies. It will chronologically analyse the development of the 
information operations and the kinetic strategies of the organisation, investigating how the 
leadership has evolved the insurgency from an exiled group in Pakistan, into one that is able 
to operate and launch coordinated and sophisticated attacks in every province of 
Afghanistan by 2012. The importance of religion in the Taliban’s messaging will be examined, 
along with the evolution of dissemination techniques, going from simple word of mouth and 
public letters known as ‘shabnamah’, to the incorporation of technology such as DVDs, 
websites and mobile phone media. The investigation into the chronological progress of the 
Taliban’s kinetic strategies will show how they have effectively made use of denial, 
demoralisation, infiltration, interdiction and concentration against the Afghan and 
international forces. Finally, the theoretical debate of whether the Taliban is fighting a new 
or classic style of insurgency will be explored. It will demonstrate the futility of Hammes’ 
argument that the Taliban is fighting a ‘fourth generation war’, and that Liang and 
Xiangsui’s ‘unrestricted warfare’ is too complex for the Taliban to undertake successfully. 
The Taliban have adapted traditional approaches from historical Afghan conflicts into a style 
of warfare that best mirrors the classic strategies of a Maoist guerrilla war.
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The Development of the Taliban’s 
Information Operations and Kinetic 
Strategies Since 2001: A New or Classic 
Approach? 
Introduction 
The contemporary nature of the Afghanistan conflict means that any analysis or literature on 
the topic is out of date almost immediately because of the daily changes in the country. 
Nevertheless, there has been much public and scholarly debate regarding the counter-
insurgency facets of the war. Comparatively though, the academic literature on the 
insurgency itself is distinctly lacking. The bulk of the post-2001 Taliban literature tends to 
focus on three areas: The links between the insurgent actors and Al-Qaeda, understandably 
seeing as the 9/11 attacks were the pre-text for the war; on the Taliban and Al-Qaeda’s links 
to the drugs trade, with Gretchen Peters being the respected source on the topic;
1
 and finally, 
on the history of the Taliban, documenting their rise to power in the 1990s and then offering 
some contemporary analysis on the insurgency itself. The strategies of the Taliban have been 
briefly discussed, most authoritatively in chapters by Antonio Giustozzi
2
 and David 
Kilcullen
3
, including their approaches towards kinetic engagements, propaganda, 
organisation and shadow government to name but a few. These key texts though are already 
over three years out of date, and the Taliban of 2007, which fought a guerrilla war largely in 
the South and East, by 2012 has spread to every province in Afghanistan and is able to launch 
coordinated attacks in ‘highly secure’ urban areas due to widespread infiltration of the 
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Government of Afghanistan’s (GoA) forces. The way in which the Taliban have developed 
their strategies has also led to debates as to whether they are fighting a new or classic style of 
insurgency. General Barno and Thomas Hammes believe that the Taliban is indeed fighting a 
new style of guerrilla war, along the lines of Hammes’ ‘fourth generation warfare’, which 
targets the enemy’s population and decision-makers in order to demonstrate to them that the 
price of victory will be too costly and will take too long.
4
 Other theories such as Taber’s War 
of the Flea
5
, Liang’s and Xiangsui’s ‘Unrestricted Warfare’6, and Mao’s ‘Protracted War’7 
have also been described in reference to the Taliban’s strategies of warfare. Although it must 
be remembered that every conflict is different, Mao’s stratagems for insurgency do seem to 
best describe the Taliban’s style of guerrilla war. Indeed, Mao is the only strategic literature 
known to have had at least an indirect connection with the Taliban leadership from the 
Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) guidance of the mujahideen during their war with 
the Soviets.   
This project aims to map the development of the Taliban’s strategies from the 
beginning of the insurgency in 2001 to 2012 in order to address the small body of academic 
literature on the topic. To facilitate sufficient depth of analysis it will only focus on two areas 
of the Taliban’s strategy. These will be the kinetic, and the propaganda and intimidation 
strategies of the Taliban. This is because these two areas best demonstrate the ability of the 
Taliban leadership to evolve and adapt to the situation at hand, and also, because it would 
seem that these two areas are a priority for the Taliban themselves, which is highlighted by 
the former southern Taliban commander Mansour Dadullah’s statement to the Afghan people 
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that, “they must continue to wage jihad, wherever they may be – whether it is jihad of the pen, 
of the tongue, of the sword, or of money”.8 The tactics of the Taliban will not be addressed 
unless, like suicide bombings, they can highlight some strategic thinking of the leadership. 
The development of these strategies will then be examined with reference to four insurgency 
theories to show that the Taliban are fighting a classic insurgency which is most in line with 
Mao’s theories. They are fighting a population-centric insurgency, cultivating or coercing 
support at a local level, and placing a primacy on the political aspects of the war, be it 
propaganda or the targets which they are attacking. First, though, the background and 
organisation of the Taliban will be detailed. 
Since 2001 there has been a rapid increase in the amount of insurgent groups 
operating within Afghanistan, such as Hizb-i-Islami, the Haqqani Network, Al-Qaeda and the 
Tora Bora group. The Taliban, however, is by far the largest insurgent group operating within 
Afghanistan, and as such will be the sole focus of the examination. The Taliban ruled the 
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan from 1996 to their deposition in 2001. The group was created 
in late 1994, intended only to be a local solution to banditry and corruption in the provinces 
of Maiwand and Panjwai during the topakiyaan (time of men with guns) period.
9
 The group 
soon became a national phenomenon though, and grew from a small band of militia with little 
money, supplies and weapons, to the ruling government in under two years. After the group 
was ousted in late 2001 much of its leadership fled south into Pakistan, with the Taliban’s 
leader, Mullah Omar, reportedly riding out of Afghanistan on a motorbike in early January 
2002.
10
 The leadership formed a shura (council) in Quetta, Pakistan, during 2002 and began 
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sending insurgents back into Afghanistan as part of “vanguard teams” who were tasked with 
building support networks that could assist in future operations in the country.
11
 Gradually 
these informal support networks have grown into rudimentary shadow governments in areas 
where the Taliban have been able to consolidate their gains. Here they have offered basic 
services such as a justice system based upon Islamic Sharia law, which is often preferred to 
the official justice system that is usually corrupt, slow and biased. The insurgency itself is 
organised around ‘core’ and ‘auxiliary’ units. The ‘core’ units are full-time fighters who 
travel around districts, and operate in accordance to the Quetta shura’s strategies, whereas the 
‘auxiliary’ units operate on an ad-hoc basis and at a local level only, supporting the ‘core’ 
units. It is these ‘auxiliary’ units which Kilcullen describes as “accidental guerrillas”.12 The 
leadership of the Taliban has placed a great emphasis on minimising the organisation’s 
vulnerability to counterinsurgency efforts by decentralising itself as much as it can, allowing 
field commanders to use their initiative at district and provincial levels in order to best serve 
the appropriate strategic orders which they have been given. This has led to claims, by Ben 
Smith for example, that the Taliban does not possess any strategic leadership at all and 
instead that the group is just an amalgamation of local level commanders who have similar 
goals.
13
 By analysing the development of the Taliban’s kinetic and propaganda strategies 
though, it will be shown that the Taliban does possess strategic leadership, able to evolve and 
react to changing conditions within Afghanistan, demonstrating the superficiality of Smith’s 
views. First though, a review and focus on the topic’s literature will be conducted.    
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Literature Review 
The literature regarding the war in Afghanistan is extremely disproportionate, with the 
majority focusing on the counterinsurgency effort and comparatively very little being 
dedicated to the understanding of the insurgency itself. The majority of authors who do write 
books and articles about the Taliban and insurgency are journalists who typically provide 
general overviews of the history of the Taliban during the 90s and then some analysis of the 
post-2001 organisation of the group. With the conflict still ongoing, these types of sources are 
very valuable for the information they provide, especially the likes of Ahmed Rashid
14
, Syed 
Saleem Shahzad
15
 and James Fergusson,
16
 who have contacts within the insurgency and 
therefore provide insights which some other authors could never gain. The major limitation 
for these sources is that they are designed for a wide readership and thus lack the analytical 
depth which is usually expected from academic texts. Shahzad also demonstrates some bias 
against the West in his text which obviously has to be taken account of when referencing him. 
With the contemporary nature of the war, journalists who regularly write in reputable media 
outlets are the major source of timely and accurate information allowing the developments of 
the Taliban to be monitored on an almost daily basis. 
 Of the academics that do write about the Taliban, Giustozzi is by far the most 
authoritative source on the topic. He has written numerous chapters and articles, however, the 
key text on the subject is his 2008 book The Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop.
17
 This text 
provides the first expansive examination of the Taliban’s re-emergence after 2001, focusing 
on their recruitment, organisation, strategy, and tactics, and also the counter-insurgency effort. 
He successfully describes the broad development of the Taliban in the areas he focuses on, 
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although, as the text was published in 2008, there is now a literary gap of the development of 
the Taliban between late 2007 and 2012. Even though this book is by far the most useful 
scholarly text, Giustozzi’s attempt to focus on so many areas of the Taliban does come at a 
disadvantage in that he tends to describe rather than analyse, for example, the strategy chapter 
is split into so many sub-sections that some of the depth of investigation is deficient. In one 
sub-section Giustozzi attempts to address whether the Taliban is fighting a theoretical ‘new’ 
or classic insurgency by comparing Hammes’ ‘fourth generation warfare’, Taber’s ‘war of 
the flea’, and Mao’s ‘people’s war’ to Taliban strategies since 2001. This section of the 
chapter though is where the text is weakest. He talks of Hammes’ ‘fourth generation warfare’ 
as if it is a ‘strategy’ which can be followed, however, it is only a theory used to describe 
historical ‘generations’ of warfare. Coupled with this, he argues that the main reason why the 
Taliban is likened to a Maoist protracted war is because of “US Special Forces officers 
superimposing what they have learnt in Fort Bragg on to a rather messy reality on the 
ground”.18 The Taliban’s distinct phases of war, and the primacy placed on the political 
aspects of the insurgency though suggests that the similitude with Mao should not be 
dismissed so brashly. This therefore presents itself as a research question that can be 
examined. In order to achieve sufficient investigation, avoiding the pitfalls of Giustozzi’s text, 
this project will focus on just two areas of Taliban strategy which will be outlined below.  
 Another source of literature on the Taliban comes from former military personnel, 
with the most authoritative resource being Kilcullen’s text The Accidental Guerrilla.19 
Kilcullen’s book provides an excellent explanation of how the Taliban organises itself in the 
field, describing the differences between full-time “core” fighters and auxiliary “accidental 
guerrillas” who fight on a local basis due to family pride and honour.20 One of Kilcullen’s 
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main arguments is that the Taliban place a primacy on propaganda and information strategies 
over kinetic strategies, stating that “the insurgents treat propaganda as their main effort, 
coordinating physical attacks in support of a sophisticated propaganda campaign”.21 With the 
relatively limited academic literature on the Taliban there has not yet been any substantial 
investigation, other than Kilcullen’s into the comparative importance which the Taliban 
places on its information operations and kinetic strategies. This will therefore be another 
research question, and in order to facilitate its answer the two areas of Taliban strategy to be 
investigated will be the Taliban’s information operations and their kinetic strategies. 
 In terms of literature on the propaganda and intimidation strategies of the Taliban, 
there have been a few article length documents released by international organisations. The 
most important of these is the report released by the International Crisis Group titled ‘Taliban 
Propaganda: Winning the War of Words?’22 This document offers an extremely detailed 
examination of the Taliban’s propaganda, however, with it being published in 2008 it again 
leaves a gap for the subsequent years. Within this sub-field the primary documents released 
by the Taliban are of extreme importance such as ‘codes of conduct’ known as layeha’s, and 
‘night letters’ called shabnamah which are sourced from the English language website of the 
Taliban
23
, the Taliban linked twitter accounts and other sources after having been translated. 
These documents provide an insight into Taliban mindsets, but obviously have to be used in 
caution due to the fact that they are meant to be propaganda. Analysis of these primary 
documents and the information strategies of the Taliban are best provided by Thomas 
Johnson who has written a number of niche articles revolving around the layeha releases. 
Freelance analyst Tim Foxley is also an invaluable asset to the reader of Taliban information 
operations as his blog is regularly updated with discussions of contemporary propaganda 
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issues, such as the ‘Twitter wars’ of 2012.24 The release of Taliban documents and 
subsequent analyses has resulted in a nexus of niche articles which would benefit from a 
consolidated approach to illustrate the chronological development of the Taliban’s 
propaganda and intimidation strategies. 
 The basis of literature about the kinetic strategies of the Taliban revolves around 
articles and books by Giustozzi, Kilcullen, Shahzad and Rashid. However, the best 
illustration of the chronological development of the Taliban’s kinetic strategies comes from 
an amalgamation of the multitude of news articles and reports of incidents and trends since 
2001. These news reports individually only provide a small frame through which to view the 
Taliban, yet when looked at in the context of each other they can provide important insights 
into the evolution of the Taliban’s strategies each year. Official reports and documents, such 
as the leaked NATO ‘State of the Taliban 2012’25, the released US House of Representatives 
report ‘Warlord Inc’26, and commercial documents such as the Indicium Consulting Paper27 
regarding Taliban infiltration, all provide imperative observations on various aspects of the 
Taliban’s overall kinetic strategy. Much as the case with the propaganda literature, the kinetic 
strategy literature also consists of numerous sources of information, with only Giustozzi 
attempting a fused analysis of development up to 2007. As such, this project will attempt to 
build on, and develop Giustozzi’s attempt, creating an amalgamated study of the Taliban’s 
kinetic strategies from 2001 to 2012.  
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 This literature review has demonstrated that the information regarding the Taliban is 
very diverse. As such there is a need to provide a fused analysis of the information and 
kinetic strategies of the Taliban and to show their chronological evolution. This will then 
allow a greater comparison of four theories which Giustozzi and Kilcullen allude to in order 
to assess whether the Taliban is fighting a new or classic form of insurgency. It will also 
allow the reader to decide whether the Taliban gives primacy to one area over the other. The 
research questions that will be addressed are thus as follows: 
 What developments have the Taliban made in their propaganda and intimidation 
strategies? 
 What developments have the Taliban made in their kinetic strategies? 
 Does the Taliban give primacy to propaganda over kinetic engagements? 
 Using the theories of Hammes, Liang and Xiangsui, Taber and Mao: Is the Taliban 
fighting a new or classic form of insurgency? 
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Information Operations 
This section will deal with the Taliban’s strategies relating to propaganda, media campaigns, 
and intimidation and psychological techniques. The Taliban engages in all of the above terms 
via a range of communications media, and as such pose a challenge in providing a single 
‘umbrella term’ to cover them all. This difficulty is highlighted by Foxley who states that, 
“Taliban communications techniques do not lend themselves to precise descriptions such as 
‘information operations’, ‘propaganda’, ‘hearts and minds’  or ‘media campaign’...and in 
practice their activities usually fall between these terms”.28 The term ‘information operations’ 
has been chosen, however, as the title for this section because it encapsulates not just 
propaganda but psychological and intimidation techniques too. The developing content of 
what the Taliban has been saying since 2001 will first be examined followed by showing the 
diversification of the media types that they have employed.  
Content 
 The Taliban has sought to gain legitimacy and support through its communications 
since 2001. As Foxley highlights, the Taliban leadership directs its information operations in 
accordance with two strategic goals: “The ejection of all foreign military forces and the re-
establishment of the Taliban-run Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan”, however, “the bulk of the 
media effort is directed at the former, rather than the latter, of the two strategic goals”.29 
Since 2001 Islam has been the main justification that the Taliban leadership has offered for 
fighting. In late September 2001 Mullah Omar told the Voice of America that the friction 
with America is “an issue of Islam. Islam’s prestige is at stake. So is Afghanistan’s 
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tradition”.30  This point is further highlighted by a November 2002 shabnamah  which was 
disseminated throughout Afghanistan and faxed to Pakistani journalists, stating that Mullah 
Omar had declared “’jihad’ against the foreign forces in Afghanistan and the ‘proxy 
government’”.31 The rhetoric of using religion as a unifying force amongst the rank-and-file 
Taliban, and as a rallying call to increase the support for their cause, can be seen as a constant 
throughout the insurgency, right up until 2012. In 2008 Graeme Smith led a series of fact-
finding interviews with Taliban insurgents in Kandahar province. When they were asked why 
they fought, the “majority used some variation of two lines: “Afghans must expel infidels” 
and “infidels enslaved the government”. Several others referred to religious teachings, 
quoting textual sources even though they are probably illiterate”.32 These interviews highlight 
that religion and jihad is still being used as the main justification for hostilities, and also due 
to a high proportion of the Taliban soldiers being illiterate, that word of mouth is an 
extremely important method of communicating their messages. The fact that the majority of 
the content of the Taliban’s communications are justified by, or related to, Islam also shows 
that the main target audience is the Afghan population and the wider Muslim world. This 
theory is further bolstered by pointing out that apart from an English language section on 
their website, and some Arabic language magazines and website section, the majority of the 
information operations is done in Pashtu. 
 This becomes even more interesting when it is considered what content the Taliban is 
not using in its information operations as a unifying factor, ‘tribalism’. Although the Taliban 
has used some tribal references in its communications, mainly ‘Pashtun’ related, in general 
the “tribal aspect of the war...seems to be a touchy subject for the Taliban leadership, which 
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prefers to describe religion – not tribe or ethnicity – as the insurgency’s unifying force”.33 
Despite the majority of the Taliban leadership being made up of tribal members belonging to 
the Ghilzai confederation, they try not to mention tribal denominations in propaganda at the 
strategic level, because, as the International Crisis Group’s report points out, “such labels risk 
becoming self-fulfilling and could marginalise and alienate some Pashtun groups even 
more”.34 
 The content from the early stages of the insurgency, as well as revolving around 
religious rhetoric, sought to communicate the insurgent’s successes against their enemy 
forces. At the strategic level this was purported through a plethora of ‘authorised 
representatives’, such as Mohammad Mukhtar Mujahid in early 2003, or Hamed Agha in 
early 2004, however, it was Latifullah Hakimi, a Taliban era official, who became the 
Taliban’s most authoritative ‘spokesman’ for journalists to deal with.35 These spokesmen 
would speak to journalists, mainly in Pakistan, and illustrate incidents which the Taliban had 
carried out, in order to demonstrate their growing strength. Another role they performed was 
to complain about the atrocities that the Karzai regime and Western forces carried out when 
civilian deaths occurred. Hakimi was arrested in 2005, and of his two successors, Qari 
Yousaf and Dr Hanif, the latter was arrested in 2007, so as Joanna Nathan explains, 
“presumably to spare such humiliation being repeated, the two main points of contact today – 
Qari Yousaf...and Zabihullah Mujahid...are aliases used by a variety of people according to 
journalists who deal with them”.36   
 From 2005 onwards, when the Taliban began using DVDs and the internet more 
profusely they increasingly signed statements off, or described themselves as the ‘Islamic 
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Emirate of Afghanistan’ to try to garner further legitimacy in the sense that they were a 
government in exile rather than an insurgency group. These new media forms allowed the 
content of Taliban information operations to address new and more complicated issues such 
as justifying suicide bombings, outlining atrocities by Christians in other Islamic states, 
revealing US soldiers desecrating Talib corpses, and atrocities against Islam at Guantanamo 
Bay. 
37
 David Grono, the Deputy President of the International Crisis Group, speaks of how 
the Taliban has increasingly pointed out the growing corruption in the Karzai government, as 
well as claiming that the Western nations announcements of withdrawal is because the 
Taliban have “tired them out”.38 The increasing use of the Taliban’s rhetoric regarding the 
Karzai regime’s corruption carries legitimacy in the eyes of ordinary Afghans because the 
swift rise of the Taliban in 1994 was due in large part to the retributive justice they meted out 
on bandits and corrupt officials during the topakiyaan (time of men with guns) when almost 
every road across the country was manned by a warlord demanding a ‘toll’.39 
 In 2006 the Taliban attempted to develop their simplistic Islamic rhetoric into a more 
solid political foundation for its actions to be based on. Between 2006 and 2008 the Taliban 
directed their propaganda efforts around a series of five slogans: “Our Party, the Taliban; Our 
people and nation, the Pashtun; Our economy, the poppy; Our constitution, the Shari’a; Our 
form of government, the emirate”.40 As Kilcullen highlights, “these slogans provided a 
rudimentary political platform for insurgent activity and were used as a guide to structure 
messages to the population and manipulate public perception of the movement”.41 This 
period demonstrated the Taliban’s increasing development in their capability to formulate 
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and direct information operations successfully at the strategic level, and according to 
Kilcullen, they made information operations their main effort, even directing their kinetic 
operations around these slogans.
42
 The content of these slogans allowed for a series of 
“rallying calls” which individually were “vague enough that [they could] be interpreted in 
numerous different ways by different components of the population”, which meant that from 
this point Islam was not the only unifying factor that the Taliban were focussing their rhetoric 
on.  
 Since the rise of social networks a number of Taliban accounts began appearing and 
issuing news reports and small statements, as well as publicly engaging ISAF and Afghan 
Government accounts. These social media accounts are probably not official Taliban run 
channels, however, they show the increasing ability of the organisation to influence a global 
audience and gain support worldwide. These accounts often engage in ‘twitter wars’ for 
example with ISAF related accounts. On June 17
th
 2012 one such spat occurred, when Lt Col’ 
Stewart Upton, a spokesman of ISAF Regional Command South West, challenged a 
prominent Taliban related account ‘@ABalkhii’ on the news that a Taliban IED had killed 
eight ISAF troops, he concluded that “by engaging them yesterday on their false claim, they 
were held to account for their post and forced to somehow try and validate it”.43 However, as 
Foxley correctly points out, by engaging the Taliban on these types of social networks (where 
only 140 characters are permitted per post) the ISAF forces are surrendering the initiative 
because a rebuttal cannot be intelligently put across in such a small word limit.
44
 The Taliban 
have been increasingly using such social media sites to espouse changes in strategy, issue 
incident reports, highlight their worldview and discuss internal dilemmas, whether or not the 
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content of these statements are legitimate or just attempts to deceive and confuse the Western 
and Afghan forces though remains to be seen.  
Techniques 
 Alongside the content, it is also important to note the development of the means 
which the Taliban employs to disseminate their information. In 2001 the Taliban 
communications machine was very basic. Taliban propaganda was rumoured to be run by 
Qudratullah Jamal (aka Hamid Agha) who was the Information Minister when the Taliban 
was in power.
45
 In the early days of the insurgency the communication methods that were 
used were very similar to those used in the 1980s jihad against the Soviets. Word of mouth 
was, and still is, a very important tool employed by the Taliban to spread their message.  This 
is not least because of the extremely low literacy rates in Afghanistan, for example a CIA 
estimate in 2000 believed that just 28.1 percent of the population over fifteen years of age 
could read.
46
 As such the Taliban has been using the verbal spread of supportive poems for 
example, which attempt to describe atrocities committed by the international forces as well as 
outlining issues of religion, nationalism, and even satirical poems mocking an intimate 
relationship between Presidents Bush and Karzai.
47
 The poems are a traditional form of 
media which have been used for centuries in South Asia, and their continued use today is 
confirmed in Van Linschoten et al’s 2012 text Poetry of the Taliban, which is a collection of 
translated poems.
48
   
Another traditional method that is widely used by the Taliban is the use of 
‘shabnamah’ (night letters) to intimidate or inform locals and officials on the views of the 
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Taliban. This method was used successfully throughout the jihad against the Soviets, and as 
such was adopted after 2001 as a proven, cost-effective and simple way of conducting 
information operations, be it to spread propaganda or threaten locals into not working for the 
Western forces or Karzai regime. Despite the lack of literacy noted above, the Taliban has 
successfully relied on the educated populace to read the letters to the illiterate sectors of 
society, which may explain why they are usually pasted to mosques and government 
buildings. The shabnamah have allowed the Taliban leadership to dictate the types of 
messages it wants spread to the Afghan population. Johnson has conducted one of the few in 
depth studies of shabnamah to date and believes that: 
“The Taliban night letters represent a strategic and effective instrument, crafting 
poetic diatribes which appeal to the moral reasoning of Afghan villagers. While many of the 
night letters represent overt intimidation, they also present important insights into who and 
what the Taliban represents”.49 
For the early years of the insurgency word of mouth and shabnamah were the main tools 
which the Taliban used to target the Afghan and local population.  
As the insurgency has developed, the Taliban tried to move away from intimidation 
techniques in order to ensure the support of villagers and townsfolk. One way in which this 
has occurred has been through the issuing of ‘layeha’, or codes of conduct, as an attempt to 
provide uniformity to the rank and file Taliban in the way they deal with the public, much 
like Mao did with his troops during the Chinese Revolutionary War. The first layeha appears 
to have been issued in 2006 by Mullah Omar in response to the resurgent Taliban 
organisation needing a set codification of its ideals, principles, and strategies.
50
 Two more 
detailed layehas have been issued in 2009 and 2010, with the latter offering a very interesting 
insight into how the Taliban has adapted after a number of their mid-high level leaders were 
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captured or killed by the ISAF forces from 2009 onwards. The publication of the three 
layehas further highlights the importance that the Taliban places on its own image, and 
according to the International Crisis Group, possibly indicates “frustration among the Taliban 
leadership and increasing attempts to exert control over what is said in its name”.51 Talking 
about the 2010 layeha, Johnson and DuPee point out that, “it appears that the Taliban have 
become particularly sensitive to local perceptions and increasingly rely upon traditional 
‘population-centric’ lines of operation to consolidate their battle for ‘hearts and minds’ of the 
Afghan populace and especially the southern, rural, Pashtun”.52 In the 2009 layeha for 
example, the importance of understanding local grievances is emphasised when ‘mujahidin’ 
are advised, in point 63 to, “follow local dresses like shoes, clothes and hairstyle. [Because] It 
will enable them to get into the public and know their problems”.53  The layeha’s 
effectiveness has been slow in developing because of the difficulty in enforcing its edicts, 
however, the impact of the 2009 and 2010 layehas have begun to be noticed at the grassroots 
level. Alissa Rubin reported in the New York Times that rural tribal elders in Kandahar 
Province for example welcomed the Taliban’s strategic change to a less threatening approach, 
with one elder, Haji-Khan Muhammad Khan stating in 2010 that, “there is a tremendous 
change in the Taliban’s behaviour...now generally they behave well with people. They had to 
change because the leadership of the Taliban did not want to lose the support of the grass 
roots”.54 Similar changes were noticed throughout Afghanistan from 2009 in the Taliban’s 
behaviour towards locals, with Mullah Omar even reportedly removing some of the most 
brutal commanders.
55
 Despite these changes though it must still be noted that assassinations, 
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collateral damage from bombings, and threatening night letters are still widespread and 
harming the Taliban’s public support and image throughout Afghanistan, with 2,332 of the 
3,021 civilian deaths in 2011 being attributed to the Taliban, which was up 8 percent from 
2010.
56
 Alongside traditional methods of communication, the Taliban has embraced 
technology in an attempt to enhance the spread of its messages, not only to the Afghan 
population but to the global arena.  
The Taliban have recognised growing trends in the use of technology in Afghanistan. 
The mobile telephone industry has seen exponential growth in the last 5 years. The Quetta 
leadership have deliberately targeted this growing market by sending out mass text, picture 
and video messages. The intent very much mirrors the use of shabnamah, in that they serve 
as a type of psychological warning to normal Afghans. From 2007 the Taliban have been 
attacking mobile phone network’s masts mainly to extort money. However, after the US 
troop surge in 2011 the insurgents began suffering higher kill and capture rates due to locals 
informing the authorities when they were planting bombs or moving about at night. Therefore 
in 2011 the Taliban decreed that there be a night time ban in the South and East of network 
coverage by the mobile phone companies.
57
 For a few months the telecommunications 
companies complied, however, in mid-2011 President Karzai warned the companies to 
provide full-time coverage or risk losing their licenses.
58
Because the companies have 
accepted Karzai’s warnings the Taliban have drastically increased their operations against 
them, as Boone points out, “since mid-summer attacks have soared, with up to 30 towers 
being destroyed or damaged in one 20-day period. Previously a loss of five would be 
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considered a bad month”.59 As well as serving to deny the ISAF and Karzai forces of 
information, the Taliban’s actions also serves the purpose of signalling the strength of the 
authority of the Taliban, or the inherent weakness of the Karzai regime in these areas.  
Another way in which the Taliban has effectively made use of technology to target the 
Afghan population and beyond is in their increasing output of DVDs and videos. Rather than 
producing them themselves it seems that they have allowed sympathetic entrepreneurs to 
create and commercially manufacture them. Giustozzi outlines that the majority are made in 
Pakistan by Omat Productions, Manbaul-Jihad, Abdullah videos and As-sahab, and sold in 
bazaars throughout Afghanistan and Pakistan for a small price.
60
 He furthers though that 
“later” (he does not specify a time frame, however, it was probably 2006 onwards) these 
DVDs were given away for free which would signify an increased funding into this type of 
activities by the Taliban.
61
 Another media type that has been increasingly outsourced to 
sympathetic entrepreneurs and linked via Al Emirah website is the production of magazines, 
in both physical and electronic formats. All of the magazines are either in Pashtu, such as 
Srak (Beam of Light) and Shahamat (Courage), or Arabic, such as Al Somood (Perseverance), 
and focus on a range of issues sympathetic to the Taliban cause.
62
 If the magazines, or groups 
producing them, do not reflect well on the Taliban then it seems that the Taliban remove the 
links from their website, as they did with the Pashtu Tora Bora magazine in 2008.
63
 
 In mid-2005 the Taliban set up their website Al Emarah
64
 (The Emirate) to provide a 
single source of output for its leadership to make statements, comments and news updates. 
Much as the layehas of 2006 onwards signalled a frustration at various sources speaking in 
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the name of the Taliban, the website can also be seen as an early attempt by the Taliban to 
provide a single legitimate source for their information output. The website has developed 
over the years, and at the time of writing (2012) provides daily updates in five languages 
(English, Farsi, Pashtu, Arabic and Urdu). It’s news updates include information about the 
insurgency as to how many “puppets” or “minions” the Taliban have killed in operations on 
that day, as well as more in depth analysis of issues such as women’s rights, the ISAF 
withdrawal and world views on political changes, such as the hopes for Dr Mohamed Mursi 
as the newly elected President of Egypt.
65
 The website also re-posts analyses and news 
reports from Western media outlets if they are favourable to the Taliban or help them boast 
about their strength and achievements. This also serves as a type of propaganda coup to add 
legitimacy to their cause and actions as they can claim that the enemy’s media is recognising 
the Taliban’s growing strength. The target audience for the website is obviously not the 
majority of the Afghan population, because of the illiteracy issue, but also because in 2010 
for example less than 10 per cent of the population possessed a computer and even less had 
access to the internet due to the poor infrastructure in Afghanistan.
66
 The intended audience, 
as the five language options would suggest, is therefore international, with the aim of 
providing information from the Taliban’s viewpoint for “interested individuals” or the 
“mainstream media” according to Nathan.67  
 By examining the development of the Taliban’s information operations it has been 
shown that the main justification for the insurgency is Islam, however, since 2006 they have 
tried to diversify their appeal by legitimising the conflict along other lines too such as 
nationalism. The Taliban see the Afghan population as the key target audience for their 
messaging, and traditional techniques such as word of mouth and shabnamah are still 
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effective at reaching this audience, although the diversification into more technologically 
advanced methods like the use of the internet, DVDs, magazines and mobile phones have 
allowed the Taliban to target the population on mass more easily, as well as a global audience. 
It is therefore apparent how important information operations are to the Taliban in 
legitimising the insurgency, however, a judgement on whether it takes primacy over kinetic 
strategies cannot be made until they have been looked at in turn. 
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Kinetic Strategy 
Since 2001 the Taliban have not had one set strategy for engaging ISAF and GoA forces, but 
instead have developed and evolved their strategies to reflect the necessity of the 
geographical area, their own strength, and their enemy’s strategies. This constant evolution, 
and sometimes revolution, in strategy has added to the Taliban’s strength as it has caused 
problems for ISAF and GoA forces that then subsequently have had to alter their approach to 
the conflict. The following section will demonstrate that as the war in Afghanistan has 
continued, the Taliban have developed strategies which has seen the insurgency spread from 
a predominantly southern phenomenon in 2001, to a national insurgency which, according to 
Shehzad Qazi, by 2009 allowed them to “control and maintain heavy insurgent activity within 
80% of the country”68. 
 Between 2001 and 2002 there was no strategy from the Taliban leadership in 
engaging its enemy’s forces. Engagements, as such, were limited to cross-border raids and 
some small scale use of long-range rockets which were little more than a nuisance for ISAF 
and GoA forces. These engagements mirrored the cross-border raids of the Afghan tribes into 
the North West Frontier during the nineteenth century, in that both were opportunistic, poorly 
organised efforts achieving relatively little more than signalling the tribal, or Taliban’s, 
continuing existence on the other side of the border. The non-existent kinetic strategy during 
this period was primarily because the organisation was still re-grouping after the U.S. 
invasion, but more importantly the priority during this period was to ‘infiltrate’ Afghanistan 
using, what Giustozzi calls, “vanguard teams”.69 These ‘vanguard teams’ infiltrated villages 
throughout Southern and South-Eastern Afghanistan in order to spread propaganda, gain 
intelligence on Government collaborators, and attempt to gain popular support for the Taliban 
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in order to hide supplies and troops.
70
 The success of these teams varied throughout 
Afghanistan, but by 2003 the Taliban had succeeded in creating a base of support in some 
southern provinces such as Helmand and Kandahar.  
 From 2003 the Taliban began attempting a ‘denial’ strategy in the areas where it had 
built up enough support to launch attacks. The aim of this strategy was to deny the Karzai 
Government a presence in rural southern Afghanistan by physically targeting Government 
officials such as diplomats, governors, policemen, doctors and teachers with shabnamah and 
an assassination campaign. As Shehzed Qazi highlights, the reasoning behind this strategy 
was: 
“to break down state control. The Government structure was already weak and lacked 
legitimacy. Targeting officials would then cause the former to flee, further reducing 
government or administrative control of an area. By further targeting government services 
and reducing the latter’s control, the neo-Taliban would ultimately gain increased control of 
society”.71 
The denial strategy was therefore an obvious extension of the infiltration period, with the aim 
of correlating the reduced ability of the Karzai Government to function at a local level, with 
an increased support for the Taliban.  
 By 2004 the Taliban had evolved its strategy to include a ‘demoralisation’ approach 
towards Government Forces in some areas, as an extension to its ‘denial’ approach. This 
strategy advocated relentless attacks upon single targets, such as militia or police barracks in 
order to demoralise these local forces and induce them to either abandon such bases, or 
simply fall back to them and adopt defensive tactics, allowing the Taliban to further increase 
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its influence over rural areas. This strategy, according to Shahzad had showed early signs of 
success as it had allowed the Taliban to increase its hold over parts of Kunhar, Nanaghar, 
Paktia and Paktika by late 2003.
72
  According to Giustozzi, the strategy was effective in 
demoralising the poorly organised Government forces because the incessant attacks by the 
Taliban, despite their high casualty rates, signified that “the Taliban were in for the long run 
and that their determination was unshakable”.73 As he continues, by 2004 the pro-government 
militias (AMF) had “stopped patrolling the countryside and confined their activities to the 
barracks and the administrative centres”, and by 2005-6 the Afghan police were “utterly 
demoralised” and were “losing any combat effectiveness”, apart from some exemptions to the 
trend such as in Zabul.
74
 The adoption of the ‘demoralisation’ strategy was therefore paying 
handsome dividends for the Taliban, however, at the cost of increasingly high casualty rates.  
 In 2005 the Taliban attempted to address the high attrition rates of the denial and 
demoralisation strategies by adopting a drastically new tactic. This was the use of suicide 
bombs against government and military facilities, judges, religious leaders, police officers 
and NGOs.
75
 As Griff Witte continues to explain, the use of suicide bombings in Afghanistan 
has “been relatively rare, despite a quarter-century of warfare” because of cultural, tribal, and 
religious beliefs, for as Nafisa Faqirzada, a 43-year-old high school teacher states in his 
article, “Afghans know that a suicide attack is forbidden in Islam”.76 The new tactics 
therefore signified that the Taliban leadership were getting help from foreign advisers, which 
Shahzad sheds light on, claiming that during 2005 the Taliban partook in a “high-frequency 
exchange of training workshops with a group of emboldened veterans from the Iraqi 
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resistance”.77 From a strategic viewpoint, the use of suicide tactics from 2005 onwards can be 
seen as an extreme development in the demoralisation strategy if it is assessed using Thomas 
Schelling’s “rationality of irrationality”78, which Robert Pape explains is “an act that is 
irrational for individual attackers [but] is meant to demonstrate credibility to a democratic 
audience that still more and greater attacks are sure to come”.79 Thus 2005 can be seen as a 
continuation and extension of the previous strategies of Taliban. 
 In 2006 the Taliban radically changed their strategy. Rather than fighting a guerrilla 
war they adopted a conventional style of positional warfare, fighting the NATO and GoA 
forces in pitched battles in and around the more urban areas of Southern Afghanistan. There 
are many speculative reasons as to why the organisation opted for such a change in strategy, 
especially when the denial and demoralisation strategies seemed to be making major progress 
for them across the Southern region. One possible reason, Giustozzi suggests, is that the 
Taliban saw the handing over of Kandahar, one of their former strongholds, from U.S. troops 
to Canadian forces as a sign of weakness by the U.S. and a possible chance for the Taliban to 
make quick gains during the transition phase.
80
 However, the levels of fighting that were seen 
in Kandahar were reflected throughout the southern provinces, in Helmand for example, and 
so this theory doesn’t really seem logical because the fighting in and around Kandahar was 
not an isolated event. The second reason which Giustozzi suggests is that the increase in 
kinetic activities was due to pressure being made on the Quetta Shura from “their Arab, 
Pakistani and other ‘donors’ to deliver a steady pace of advancement and some high profile 
victories”.81 Rashid, however, believes that the 2006 “Taliban Offensive” as he calls it, was 
carried out purely with the aim to “inflict such heavy casualties that Western publics would 
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demand a recall of their troops”.82 Rashid’s argument does seem to follow suit with the 
previous Taliban strategies which placed a paramount importance on the psychological factor 
of their kinetic activities. In reality, the reasoning behind the 2006 Taliban ‘offensive’ seems 
to be an admixture of Giustozzi’s second argument with that of Rashid’s, but also of a 
possible naivety on the part of the Taliban of their own ability to engage with superior 
Western forces in conventional battles.  
 Throughout 2006 the number of insurgents which the Taliban were placing into 
battles was unlike anything of the previous years. NATO intelligence in 2005/2006 estimated 
that the total number of troops available to the Taliban throughout the whole of the South was 
just two thousand; however, in early 2006 Mullah Dadullah launched a failed bid to capture 
Sangin, in Helmand, with 300 men, and then in May they stormed towns in four southern 
provinces with nearly one thousand fighters.
83
 Despite suffering losses in all of these 
engagements the Taliban were able to maintain, and even increase the number of fighters as 
the year progressed. For example, in September 1,500 Taliban fighters dug in and fought 
Canadian forces in Panjwai district, just south of Kandahar City, in a battle (named Operation 
Medusa by the Canadians) which lasted from 4
th
 September to 17
th
 September.
84
 The Taliban 
suffered estimated losses of 1,100, with NATO reckoning that between 1,500 and 2,000 
Taliban fighters were concentrated in the area throughout the battle, with reinforcements 
coming from Pakistan, which was by far the largest concentration of forces the Taliban had 
fielded since 2001.
85
 With fighting raging throughout the year, 2006 was also the first time 
that the Taliban had diverged from its typical pattern of fighting during the Summer and 
regrouping during the Winter. Although it is without doubt that the Taliban was defeated 
tactically, it can be argued that the psychological effect that was felt throughout Afghanistan 
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and the NATO governments could be likened to that of the Tet Offensive in Vietnam. Despite 
the astronomical casualty rates for an insurgent force, by 2007 in Panjwai district, for 
example, Seth Jones stated that “the levels of Taliban...were back up to pre-Operation 
Medusa”, showing that they had no problems replenishing their ranks.86 Strategically, 
Shahzad argues that the 2006 offensive was a success as it allowed the Taliban to take control 
of key districts, facilitating the spread of the insurgency further North and West, as well as 
the ability to control key logistical routes between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
87
 He visited 
Helmand province in November 2006 and claims that the Taliban had control of nearly every 
district, apart from Laskhar Gah and Greshk where British forces were based
88
, thus even 
though the Taliban could not overcome the superior forces there, it successfully focused the 
attention of the NATO forces in and around these areas, allowing the infiltration and control 
of the rest of Helmand for example.  
 Despite the strategic gains of 2006, in 2007 they reverted back to a seasonal guerrilla 
approach. If 2006 can be characterised as an attempt to force a decision through a 
conventional approach, then the 2007 strategy of the Taliban was a regress to fighting a war 
of exhaustion. Rather than tackling NATO and GoA forces head on, they avoided large 
concentrations of troops and moved to areas where there was little government presence. For 
example, in Kandahar, NATO and GoA troops were still largely focussing on the defence of 
Panjwai and Kandahar City which left large areas in northern Kandahar undefended. The 
Taliban made use of this weakness and moved insurgents into Shah Wali Kot and Khakrez 
during late 2006, early 2007, and had free reign of the area until June 2007 when NATO 
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launched an offensive on these areas, named Operation Andalat.
89
 In an exception for 2007, 
the Taliban stood and fought for Khakrez, taking heavy casualties, but not losing total control 
of the area.
90
 By October the NATO forces had withdrawn, not having the resources to 
support a ‘holding’ operation, and so the Taliban regained control, reportedly paying off the 
district and police chiefs of Khakrez.
91
 In accordance with the change in strategy to one of 
attrition, the Taliban attempted a number of simultaneous attacks on district centres which 
were lightly guarded compared to the urban areas they were trying to take in 2006. On June 
16
th
 they nearly succeeded in overthrowing a Dutch outpost in Chora Disctrict of Uruzgan; on 
June 18
th
 they seized Mianishin district centre; and on June 19
th
 they overran Ghorak district 
centre.
92
 Similar incidents occurred throughout the south of Afghanistan during 2007, which 
is demonstrated by a UN quarterly report which stated that as of August 2007, the average 
number of monthly incidents stood at 2,108, “up 39 percent from the same period a year 
earlier”.93 It is interesting to note though that the Taliban seemed to be consolidating areas in 
the South rather than attempting any real push for new regions, for as one NATO source told 
the Guardian, “70 per cent of the incidents took place in just 10 per cent of the country”.94 
 The aim of 2008 for the Taliban seemed twofold: firstly, to disrupt the supply lines of 
NATO and GoA forces; secondly, to expand the insurgency further east and north. As a 
Kabul Center for Strategic Studies report explains, in an interview with Al Samood, the 
Taliban’s Arabic monthly publication, Mullah Omar and his deputies outlined their military 
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objectives for the year which included seizing the highway between Jalalahbad and Kabul.
95
 
The focus on supply routes was also signalled during April, in the opening weeks of the 
fighting season, when the Taliban took advantage of NATO’s political inability to fight in 
Pakistan by destroying a key bridge on the Indus Highway in the North West Frontier 
Province.
96
 This trend continued throughout the year, for example the Khyber Pass, through 
which 70 percent of NATO supplies travel, was closed six times between September 2008 
and February 2009 due to attacks,
97
 and in December 2008 alone Taliban attacks on NATO 
supply depots in Pakistan destroyed 300 cargo trucks and Humvees.
98
 Within Afghanistan 
itself the Taliban expanded north and east during 2008, with Gilles Dorronsoro reporting a 
“fivefold increase” in incidents in Balk and Kunduz provinces in northern Afghanistan99, and 
the Kabul Center for Strategic Studies reporting a 61% increase in incidents in eastern 
provinces in the first six months of 2008.
100
 The Taliban were also demonstrating their ability 
to coordinate more complex attacks, sometimes simultaneously, signalling an increasing level 
of strategic planning capability. This capability was demonstrated in their timely assault on 
the Arghandab Valley after the death of prominent anti-Taliban commander Mullah Naqib, 
and by the sophisticated jail break in Kandahar city in June 2008 when they freed 1,100 
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prisoners of which 400 were Taliban fighters.
101
 Thus 2008 seen the expansion of the Taliban 
north and east, and the attempt at hindering NATO supplies in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.  
 2009 seen the continuation of the previous denial and demoralisation strategies, with 
the only real development being a greater emphasis on the interdiction of NATO supplies. 
This was carried out in three ways: officially the Taliban propagated the arrest and capture of 
supplies; unofficially, and more commonly the Taliban either set up checkpoints along the 
highways they controlled to collect tolls; or, increasingly planted IEDs to target both NATO 
supplies and personnel. The 2009 Layeha which was issued by the Taliban highlights the 
official line, which proposed the arrest of anyone found transporting “infidel” goods, or 
justified that “if a driver tried to run, the mujahideen are allowed to open fire on him”.102 It 
lays out strict instructions for the looting of NATO logistics, stating that the captured material 
called ‘Ghaneemat’ must be split, with 20 percent being sent to the ‘Baitul Maal’ (treasury, 
presumably at the district or provincial level) and the remaining 80 percent being distributed 
amongst the insurgents who fought in that particular battle.
103
 However, a report by the US 
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs believes that the Taliban are 
regularly extorting money from NATO logistics sub-contractors in return for safe passage 
through Taliban controlled areas, as Haji Fata, the CEO of Mirzada Transportation Company, 
was quoted in the report as saying in 2009, “every truck costs about $200 as a bribe I pay on 
the route”.104 Even by December 2009, Secretary Clinton stated to the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee that “one of the major sources of funding for the Taliban is the 
protection money”.105  As well as targeting the NATO supplies through capture and extortion, 
the Taliban significantly targeted the NATO supply chain through the use of Improvised 
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Explosive Devices (IEDs) which were also used to target ISAF and GoA forces personnel. In 
2009 the US military recorded 8,159 IED incidents throughout Afghanistan, compared to 
3,867 in 2008, and 2,677 in 2007.
106
  
 The Taliban, in 2010, seemed to focus their attention towards the foreign forces a lot 
more than in previous years. There are various possible reasons for this occurrence. The most 
likely could be that the Taliban seen the US troop surge of 30,000 extra troops to the south 
and Kabul as a metaphorical ‘last throw of the dice’, especially after NATO announced the 
handover of security to Afghan forces by 2014 at the Lisbon Summit in February. Statistics 
from the Canadian backed Human Security Report Project show that the Taliban increased its 
use of IEDs to target coalition troops, which is demonstrated by the fact that in 2009 there 
were 2,786 coalition forces personnel injured by IED attacks, whereas in 2010 the figure rose 
45.5% to 4,054.
107
 The Taliban seemed to fight sensibly in 2010 by trading space for time, 
ceding some areas in the south without a fight to the surge. They did stand and fight for 
control of some areas, for example in north-eastern Laghman province the ANA launched an 
offensive in August, but the Taliban beat back the offensive, with Dorronsoro describing it as 
“disastrous” for the ANA.108 While the NATO and GoA were firmly focussed on controlling 
the south, the Taliban tried to consolidate its control of eastern provinces, which would allow 
them strategic staging posts for attacks on Kabul. By the end of 2010 they had control of 
Nuristan province
109
, after NATO had ceased to defend it properly from 2009, and also of 
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northern Wardak province
110
, both of which bordered Kabul and possessed strategic benefits 
for the Taliban. 
 In June 2011 President Obama announced his intentions to begin early troop 
withdrawals during 2011 and 2012, something which the majority of the other ISAF forces 
quickly followed suit in. Coupled with the Lisbon Summit announcement, the coalition forces 
began drawing down their rural bases and focussing on the defence of the urban areas, 
leaving the ANA to defend the countryside. As a result the Taliban increased its efforts to 
mount sophisticated attacks on urban areas in order to signal to coalition forces that they were 
not just going to ‘run the clock down’, and that the Taliban could retake ‘cleared’ areas if 
they wanted (although they could never ‘hold’ the areas which NATO forces wanted due to 
the overwhelming airpower they could bring to bear). Tony Karon likened this strategy to 
having the psychological effect of the Tet Offensive in Vietnam, in that the Taliban’s attacks 
signalled more and more their resilience, and reminded NATO and the GoA that “winning, 
for the Taliban, after all, is simply a matter of not losing”.111 For example, in early May the 
Taliban fought a 36 hour pitched battle in Kandahar city after infiltrating hundreds of men 
and weapons into the city, then two days later mounted a large attack against GoA forces in 
Nuristan with 400 insurgents, as well as launching other similar attacks throughout the 
country.
112
 A second development in Taliban strategy in 2011 was the greater emphasis put 
on infiltration of the GoA forces. Although the infiltration of, and incidents by, infiltration 
occur at the tactical level, they have serious strategic consequences such as “eroding the trust 
towards the ANSF in the eyes of international community and local population; demoralizing 
the ANSF and Afghan population’ and winning a propaganda victory in the local and 
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international media”.113 The most common type of infiltration, but one that is usually ‘ad hoc’ 
and requires no strategic planning is the use of “turnarounds” where low level members of 
the GoA forces are offered rewards, or coerced, to smuggle equipment or material to the 
insurgents, provide intelligence on operations and locations, allow insurgents access to 
restricted areas, or even to carry out fratricidal attacks themselves.
114
 It is evident though that 
a number of pre-planned and sophisticated attacks were only possible in 2011 because of the 
use of infiltrated Afghan security personnel allowing insurgents through complex security 
cordons. For example, one of the major incidents which occurred in 2011 was the Taliban 
attack on the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul on June 28th, when nine attackers were able to 
get through numerous ANP and ANA checkpoints throughout the city, and into a highly 
secure hotel through the service entrance at a time when it was accommodating “a high-level 
GoA delegation and other VIPs”.115 This attack is highly unlikely to have been able to have 
been mounted without inside information or knowledge of the security layout. In August 
2012, Mullah Omar claimed that infiltration was indeed a plan from Quetta during 2011, 
stating that the insurgents had infiltrated GoA forces “according to the plan given to them last 
year”.116 This strategy has continued in 2012, with fratricidal incidents increasing on a 
weekly basis. The Taliban has even created a department to deal specifically with infiltration 
and ‘turnarounds’ known as the Department of ‘Call and Guidance, Luring and 
Integration’.117 Indeed, the impact that this strategy has had upon the GoA forces is 
demonstrated by the announcement from the US and GoA on 2
nd
 September 2012 that they 
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are ceasing the training of Afghan Local Police while they vet all current policemen in an 
attempt to root out Taliban presence.
118
  
 The Taliban also continues to focus its military attention to mounting sophisticated 
urban attacks, which is evidently aided by its infiltration of the GoA forces in previous years. 
For example, the opening move of the 2012 ‘Spring Offensive’ was a complex and 
coordinated attack in April where, as Jon Boone explains, “dozens of fighters launched gun, 
rocket and suicide attacks on embassies, Nato bases, parliament and government buildings in 
the capital, as well as Nato targets in three eastern provinces”. 119 By using such low figures 
in the attack on Kabul it is evident that the Taliban were not attempting to gain control of the 
city itself, the attacks were largely ineffective in the physical sense, however, in terms of a 
psychological impact the Taliban demonstrated that it had the capability to attack supposedly 
one of the most secure districts of Afghanistan, the diplomatic district, at will. A number of 
other urban attacks have followed since this opening gambit, and it would also seem that the 
Taliban is attempting to reach into provinces and districts that have seen little violence since 
2001. For example, in July 2012 the Taliban assassinated Uzbek member of parliament 
Ahmed Khan Samangani, then a few days later blew up 22 NATO tankers in Samangani 
province which had been “among the few relatively secure parts of Afghanistan”.120 Similar 
incidents have occurred in other previously peaceful provinces throughout July, such as in 
Bamiyan province in the central highlands which was considered secure enough to be the first 
province handed over from NATO forces to the ANA in 2011.
121
 Throughout 2012 there 
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have emerged two distinct schools of thought on the issue of why the Taliban is now focusing 
on small numbered, coordinated urban attacks, and attempting to spread to areas of previous 
security. Dan Lamothe believes that the new Taliban strategy is because they have become 
weakened in the last few years due to increased counter-insurgency efforts, and because of a 
declining supply of equipment, manpower and support, thus they are forced to use low 
numbers in each attack, and are finding it increasingly necessary to carry out ‘spectacular’ 
attacks in order to maintain the level of media attention that they are used to.
122
 However, one 
of the main aims of the Taliban has always been to expel and fight the coalition ‘infidel’ 
forces, and as such since the end of 2011 NATO forces have been drawing down their rural 
bases and falling back to urban areas, for example Helmand province seen a reduction from 
over 200 bases at the end of 2011 to about 30 by June 2012.
123
 It is therefore logical that in 
order to fulfil the Taliban’s aim of expelling foreign forces, they have to attack urban areas as 
this is where NATO targets are now situated. Secondly, the claim that the Taliban is running 
low on equipment, especially IED making equipment would seem to go against the statistics 
which show that 2011 seen a 11.46 percent increase in IED attacks on 2010, and initial 
reports would show that 2012 is no exception to the trend.
124
  
 Now that the developments of the information operations and the kinetic strategies 
have been examined, the theoretical debate of whether the Taliban is fighting a new or classic 
insurgency will be engaged with. 
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‘New’ way of warfare or ‘classic’ insurgency?  
 
The Taliban’s place in insurgency theory has not been afforded the attention it deserves. 
Some of the authoritative scholars on the Taliban, such as Giustozzi, have tried to frame 
similarities and differences of the Taliban strategies with various insurgency theories.
125
 
However, only a few scholars, such as Hammes and Kilcullen have overtly stated whether 
they believe the Taliban is fighting a ‘new’ way of warfare, or a ‘classic’ form of insurgency. 
This section will highlight the arguments of the ‘new’ way scholars, but ultimately show that 
the Taliban is fighting a classic style of insurgency by presenting the resemblance of the 
Taliban’s insurgency with the mujahideen’s war against the Soviets, and the cross-border 
raids carried out during the early Twentieth century along the Durand Line. Taber and Mao’s 
theories will then be used to show the overwhelming similitude between their experiences 
and the Taliban insurgency.  
New Approach? 
Some veterans of the Afghan war, such as General David Barno, who commanded US forces 
in Afghanistan from 2003-2005, believe that the Taliban insurgency is a demonstration of 
Hammes’ ‘fourth generation warfare’, which uses political, social, economic and military 
networks to achieve “victory by putting intense, unremitting pressure on adversary 
decisionmakers, causing them to eventually capitulate, independent of military success or 
failure on the battlefield”.126 Thomas Hammes argues that the Taliban is fighting this new 
style of warfare by placing a greater focus on political will, a trend which he believes has 
been increasing since Mao, but which also allows insurgents to organise their leadership 
around a flat based network which deflects their weakness to targeting by the enemy.
127
 He 
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argues that the Taliban is targeting specific audiences with tailored messages in order to 
increase support, undermine the enemy and warn neutral spectators not to get involved, with 
the primary message attempting to persuade the ISAF decision makers that the war will be 
too long and too costly for them to win, due to the Taliban’s “superior political will”.128 
Hammes believes that fourth generation warfare is a type of linear progression, in that each 
historical period was defined by its ‘generation’ of warfare, and that since Mao there has been 
a transition period between third generation ‘wars of manoeuvre’ and fourth generation ‘wars 
of wills’, in which the Taliban firmly classifies as a fourth generation organisation.129 This 
viewpoint, however, seems somewhat naive of Hammes’ as it basically implies that no more 
than two ‘generations’ can coexist in each historical period, and that there is never a 
regression to a previous ‘generation’. As such he states that the defining feature of 
insurgencies during the ‘fourth generation’ is that they place more emphasis on “destruction 
of the enemy’s political will rather than the exhaustion of his conventional military 
power”.130 Again, this viewpoint is naive in implying that insurgencies previous to Mao 
lacked the political basis or understanding of war that is found in insurgencies today. As 
Clausewitz states, “the political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means 
can never be considered in isolation from their purpose”.131  
 Hammes’ believes that the Taliban understands the political primacy of fourth 
generation warfare, as he states that they targeted the 2004 Presidential elections because 
“they sought to undermine the legitimacy of whoever won the elections. Instead of defeating 
the government’s security forces, they plan to destroy its legitimacy”.132 Firstly, the Taliban 
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did not target the 2004 Presidential election at all because they did not want to alienate 
themselves from the population and local communities who wished to vote, for as Giustozzi 
furthers, “not a single polling station was seriously attacked anywhere in the country”.133 
Secondly, during this time the Taliban was attempting to destroy the legitimacy and psyche 
of the government’s security forces precisely by defeating them militarily, through their 
‘denial’ and ‘demoralisation’ strategies which was sapping rural areas of government 
presence through assassination and shabnamah, and confining the AMF and ANP to their 
bases. This therefore shows that Hammes is trying to impose his theories on a situation 
without thorough research as to the realities on the ground, which ultimately undermines his 
argument that the Taliban is fighting a new way of warfare as his evidence is flawed. 
 Finally, Hammes’ argues that the Taliban fits the mould of fourth generation warfare 
as strategically they are primarily attempting to target ISAF in order to change “the minds of 
decsionmakers” into thinking that the war is too costly and will take too long to win.134 This 
argument is true to an extent, as demonstrated by the Taliban’s English language website and 
the “propaganda of the deed” that Kilcullen talks about,135 however, this is not the only aim 
of the Taliban. As a senior Taliban commander told Michael Semple in an interview 
published in the New Statesman, the Taliban will continue to fight after NATO has 
withdrawn its forces in 2014, and “over time they will become stronger than the Karzai 
regime”.136 The argument that the Taliban is primarily targeting NATO decision makers is 
therefore ignorant of the Taliban’s complete aims, and short term in its outlook. Hammes’ 
arguments that the Taliban is fighting a ‘new’ approach, of fourth generation warfare, 
therefore, does not seem to hold up to detailed scrutiny.  
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 David Kilcullen alludes to the Chinese text Chao Xian Zhan(unrestricted warfare)
137
 
by Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui as a framework which demonstrates the 
Taliban’s strategies as being novel out of necessity, because of the US and Western 
dominance of conventional warfare.
138
 The Chinese colonels argue that the West, particularly 
the US, has come to dominate conventional warfare so much that they have, according to 
Kilcullen, “created a trap for themselves”139, whereby no enemy should even attempt to fight 
by conventional military means because of the certainty of defeat. According to Liang and 
Xiangsui, the developments of globalisation, (for example technology, interconnected 
economies, mass media), has meant that “fields that were formerly isolated from eachother 
are being connected. Mankind is endowing virtually every space with battlefield 
significance”, and as such, in order for the enemies of the US to overcome its conventional 
military dominance, the Chinese authors propose that these new “omnipresent” battlefields 
need to be utilised to stand any chance of victory.
140
 As Colonel Qiao said in an interview 
with the Chinese Communist Party Youth League newspaper, “the first rule of unrestricted 
warfare is that there are no rules, with nothing forbidden”.141 Liang and Xiangsui therefore 
advocate the use of “combinations” of “military, trans-military, and non-military” means in 
order to overwhelm the opposition.
142
 With reference to the Taliban, Kilcullen believes that 
they are using a ‘combination’ of guerrilla and psychological means, with “propaganda as 
their main effort”.143 The Taliban’s attacks on schools and their adoption of religiously and 
culturally controversial suicide attacks can arguably be said to demonstrate their willingness 
to overlook socially constructed rules and norms. Coupled with this is the Taliban’s attempt 
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to take on ISAF and GoA in a propaganda war which uses the internet, global media and 
mobile communications as some of its vehicles, in keeping with Liang’s and Xiangsui’s 
arguments that technological developments have created “non-natural spaces” in which a 
conflicts can be carried out.
144
 As the Chinese Colonels further, “war is no longer even war 
but rather coming to grips on the internet, and matching the mass media, assault and defense 
in forward exchange transactions, along with other things which we had never viewed as 
war”.145 Another way in which the Taliban could be said to be carrying out a version of 
‘unrestricted warfare’ is through their ability to learn, incorporate and adapt their strategies, 
for as Liang and Xiangsui state with regards to strategy, “It should not be that type of single 
prescription for treating the symptoms and not the disease, but rather a hybrid type of 
learning widely from the strong points of others and gathering advantages so as to allow a 
pear tree to bear both peaches and apples.”146 In this regard, the Taliban can be seen to have 
learnt and incorporated successful strategies, such as ‘denial’, from the Mujahideen war, the 
effectiveness of IEDs and suicide bombings from Iraq, and the futility of fighting 
conventional pitched battles in 2006. The arguments put forward by Kilcullen, and the 
framework set up by Liang and Xiangsui are more convincing that those demonstrated by 
Barno and Hammes, nevertheless it is still dubious that the Taliban are fighting in a manner 
that can constitute a ‘new way’. The authors of Unrestricted Warfare advocate the use of a 
large number of ‘combinations’, including financial, cyber, diplomatic and trade warfare to 
name but a few – the Taliban do not have the capability or means to carry out such complex 
diversification of methods. All that they have, and can manage, is the use of widespread 
propaganda and psychological warfare alongside guerrilla strategies, which is far from 
original, Mau in China and Giap in Vietnam demonstrate this. Moreover, just because these 
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propaganda wars are being conducted in ‘non-natural spaces’, it does not detract from the fact 
that the purpose of this information is ultimately to persuade and coerce people into 
supporting (or not fighting) the relevant side, whether this is done by word of mouth, DVDs, 
or in cyber space, it is only the means, not the end that has changed. It will now be 
demonstrated that the Taliban’s insurgency is best viewed as a classic form of conflict. 
Classic Approach? 
The Taliban, as an irregular force revolving around religion in order to dispel foreign 
invaders and re-establish an Islamic form of government, is hardly a new form of warfare; it 
has been part of Afghan military culture for over two centuries. In 1815 Mountstuart 
Elphinstone wrote An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul, in which he described that: 
“In foreign invasions, use might be made of the general rising of the people, called in the 
Afghaun country Ooloosee…they would be under no regulation on the King’s part, and no 
good could be expected, in regular actions, from so ungovernable a multitude; but if properly 
applied, this kind of force would not be without its advantages.”147 
Elphinstone goes on to describe how “tribes” would rise in order to come “to the aid of their 
religion”.148 These uprisings were used throughout the Nineteenth century against the British 
campaigns in Afghanistan. For example, the correspondence of Field Marshall Lord Roberts 
recounts the British Campaign of late 1879 and 1880 in trying to recapture Kabul and 
Afghanistan as a whole from an insurgent uprising. Although these insurgents lacked proper 
leadership they attempted to overwhelm and demoralise the British with their sheer numbers 
and relentless attacks, with Roberts describing a situation on 14
th
 December 1879 where the 
British had to abandon their hill posts and retreat to Sherpur after encountering 30,000 
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insurgents.
149
 Yuri Bosnin recites a similar situation occurring in July 1880 when insurgents 
“launched an offensive on Qandahar and inflicted a complete defeat on the British near the 
Afghan village of Maywand”.150 This form of relentless attack upon an enemy does not sound 
dissimilar to the ‘demoralisation’ strategy of the Taliban which they used successfully against 
the ANP and AMF in 2004 and 2005. The insurgencies of the nineteenth century did not 
possess the comparative levels of organisation and experience that the Taliban retains today; 
however, it demonstrates that this method of fighting has been the typical style in 
Afghanistan for at least two centuries. 
The two conflicts of the mujahideen war and the Taliban insurgency also offer a 
viable brief comparison to one another in order to demonstrate this Afghan style of war, not 
least because both contain adversaries with vast differences in force, finances, and firepower. 
Mohammad Yousaf, the former ISI Brigadier in charge of guiding the mujahideen’s policy 
against the Soviets, described their efforts as a strategy of a “thousand cuts”151, which could 
easily be used to describe the Taliban’s strategy against GoA and ISAF. With the Taliban 
leadership being made up of many former mujahideen warriors it is not surprising that many 
of their tactics and strategies mirror those of the Soviet era. For example, Yousaf explains 
that they had three main strategies: first was the cutting of supply lines; second, the 
assassination and sabotage of communist government officials and their supporters; and third, 
the use of long range weapons against Kabul and other cities, aiming to hit communist 
targets.
152
 The Taliban, from 2008, followed a similar targeting of ISAF’s supply lines, 
noting their vulnerability especially along the Afghan/Pakistan border. Yousaf describes a 
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typical mujahideen attack in April 1984 where they blew up numerous road bridges and 
ambushed a convoy on the Salang Highway destroying 70 tankers,
153
 an attack which would 
not be out of place in the reports coming out of Afghanistan after 2008. Also the ‘denial’ 
strategy that the Taliban have been using since the early days of the insurgency sounds 
remarkably similar to the second approach that Yousaf describes of targeting government 
officials and supporters. The strategies of the Taliban therefore can be seen to have their 
origins in the mujahideen’s war against the Soviets, and are not necessarily ‘new’ as Hammes 
and Kilcullen would have their readership believe.  
 As well as brief historical examples demonstrating that the Taliban is not fighting a 
‘new’ way of warfare, some prominent ‘classic’ insurgency theorists also demonstrate the 
fact well. During the Taliban’s original rise to power in 1994 they used a ‘foco’ strategy, 
whereby a small group of guerrillas used violence against corrupt warlords to instigate 
support, which they continuously used throughout Afghanistan until they were able to take 
Kabul. It is easy to see why some authors, such as Sean Maloney, argue that the Taliban have 
been repeating this method since 2001;
154
 however, the Taliban are in fact following a more 
population centric approach along the lines of Taber and Mao whereby the mobilisation of 
political support is a pre-requisite to violence, not the other way round as in a ‘foco’ 
insurgency. Therefore the thoughts of Robert Taber and Mao will be used to emphasize this 
point as their theories are the most similar to the modern Taliban.  Up to the end of 2005 
Giustozzi believes that Robert Taber’s ‘war of the flea’ best described the Taliban insurgency, 
but that during 2006, the “fighting around Kandahar represent[ed] a departure from that 
model”.155 Nevertheless, after 2006 the Taliban did revert back to guerrilla strategies which 
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would indicate a possible return to a ‘war of the flea’ approach. Taber describes this approach 
stating that:  
“The guerrilla fights the war of the flea, and his military enemy suffers the dog’s 
disadvantages: too much to defend, too small, ubiquitous, and agile an enemy to come to 
grips with. If the war continues long enough – this is the theory – the dog succumbs to 
exhaustion and anaemia without ever having found anything on which to close his jaws or to 
rake with his claws.”156 
It is clear that the Taliban understand Taber’s protracted form of conflict, with Shaykh 
Mustafa Abu al-Yazid (Shaykh Saeed), a member of the Quetta Shura, telling Geo TV in 
2008 that “you have the watches but we have the time”.157 According to Taber, a guerrilla 
war is “the extension of politics by means of armed conflict. It follows that the extension 
cannot come logically until all acceptable peaceful solutions – appeals, legislative and 
judicial action, and the resources of the ballot box – have been proved worthless”.158 This 
may explain why the Taliban did not attack any of the Parliamentary or Presidential elections 
in 2004 and 2005 respectively, as they wanted to allow the population to see for themselves 
the futility of such elections. After all, the Taliban had been using ‘denial’ and 
‘demoralisation’ strategies throughout the rural areas of Afghanistan, so logically, regardless 
of who was voted in, the Taliban ensured that they made minimal impact in these areas 
anyway, adding to the population’s apathy towards democratic means and, as the Taliban 
hoped, added to the support for armed struggle. Taber outlines two ways in which the ‘flea’ 
can succeed, firstly by evolving through phases until it “has recruited enough men, and come 
into possession of enough arms, to build a revolutionary army capable of defeating the 
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regular army in open battle”, or secondly, “it must continue until political developments 
resulting from the campaign have brought about the desired end: the rising of the masses of 
the people and overthrow or abdication of the discredited government”.159 With the 
overwhelming firepower of NATO forces, the first option described by Taber would be 
undertaken in vein, as demonstrated in 2006, and so the Taliban fights the war of the flea in 
the hope that their propaganda and kinetic operations will increase support for its 
organisation resulting in a ‘rise of the masses’, or until they are strong enough to overwhelm 
the GoA forces after 2014. Taber’s ‘war of the flea’ does represent a persuasive framework 
when trying to analyse the Taliban’s strategies. However, it will now be shown that a 
classical Maoist approach offers greater resemblance to the modern Taliban.  
 Mao is not the father of guerrilla warfare, it was used before he wrote On Guerrilla 
Warfare, and it has been used since, as has been demonstrated by the Afghans during the 
Nineteenth Century and again against the Soviets in the 1980s. Although some small numbers 
of Taliban commanders may have read Mao (such as former Hizb-I-Islami commanders), it is 
without doubt that they would have learnt of at least some of his strategies indirectly from ISI 
guidance during the Mujahideen War against the Soviets, and from ISI contacts during this 
conflict. As Giustozzi reiterates, “the idea that some second – or third-hand inspiration was 
taken from aspects of Mao’s theories, purged of their People’s War content, received some 
confirmation already in the form of the phases of infiltration and of stronghold build-up”.160 
Mao’s strategies can therefore be seen as the closest scholarly framework through which to 
view the Taliban’s modes of warfare, as this is one with which the Taliban have most 
definitely had at least indirect contact with.  
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 The first similarity between Mao’s strategies and those of the Taliban revolves around 
the ‘survivability’ of the guerrilla organisation. The oft quoted phrase by Mao highlights the 
primary importance of organisational survival stating, “when guerrillas engage a stronger 
enemy, they withdraw when he advances; harass him when he stops; strike him when he is 
weary; pursue him when he withdraws”161, implying that the guerrilla should primarily play 
to the enemy’s weaknesses in order to survive. This emphasis on survival can be seen in the 
decentralised nature of the Taliban’s organisation. Although strategic decisions are made 
centrally by the leadership, commanders in the field are allowed tactical freedom in order to 
best respond to local and district level situations, but also in order to protect the higher 
echelons of the organisation from counterinsurgency efforts. Giustozzi makes a similar point 
by comparing the organisation of some Mujahideen parties of the Soviet war to that of the 
Taliban: he argues that the Taliban’s leadership and organisation is a lot more sophisticated 
than the Harakat-i Enqelab-i Islami party from whose ranks many of the Taliban 
commanders “fought once”; however, compared to Hekmatyar’s Hizb-i Islami party, which 
placed great emphasis on a centralised command and control structure which went right down 
to local levels, the “sophistication of Hizb’s centralised system has not been equalled by the 
Taliban”.162 Nevertheless, he continues that ultimately Hizb’s complexity was “too 
sophisticated for Afghanistan”, and that in truth the Taliban has purposely decentralised itself 
as much as it could, without negating its ability to conduct and disseminate its strategic 
decisions, for as he concludes, “faced with an adversary immensely more powerful, the 
priority for the Taliban was to be in a position to absorb as much damage as possible without 
compromising their operational capability too much”.163 
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 The second major similarity between the Taliban’s and Mao’s strategies is the 
appearance of distinct ‘phases’ of warfare. Mao wrote that: 
“Protracted war will pass through three stages. The first stage covers the period of the 
enemy’s strategic offensive and our strategic defensive. The second stage will be the period 
of the enemy’s strategic consolidation and our preparation for the counter-offensive. The 
third stage will be the period of our strategic counter-offensive and the enemy’s strategic 
retreat”.164 
The period immediately after the fall of the Taliban in late 2001 up until late 2004 is 
generally accepted as the Taliban’s ‘strategic defensive’ stage by sources such as Giustozzi165 
and Ehsan Mehmood Khan
166
. This stage is dominated by the establishing of support and 
“base areas”167, which the Taliban did throughout the southern region during this period. 
After the first stage, authors begin to disagree on what years the Taliban progressed to the 
second and third stages. Khan believes that 2005 was characterised by “strategic stalemate” 
and “by the end of 2008, they had decisively entered the Strategic Counteroffensive Stage 
characterized by fluid hit-and-run operations and massive use of IEDs”.168 Giustozzi on the 
other hand believes that as early as 2006, the battle at Panjwai near Kandahar city 
demonstrates an attempt by the Taliban to enter the ‘third phase’.169 Both of these arguments 
though seem somewhat superficial in their understanding of Mao. Firstly, Mao describes the 
third phase of protracted war as beginning with mobile warfare but through which “positional 
warfare will rise to importance”170, and as such Khan’s claim that ‘hit-and-run operations’ 
and IEDs can be seen as a signal of mobile or positional warfare is dubious because these 
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methods are more synonymous with guerrilla warfare. Giustozzi’s claim that the Panjwai 
battle signalled a possible premature move by the Taliban to the third stage does hold more 
credit as it is possible that the Taliban underestimated ISAF strength and overestimated their 
own. Another possibility though is that the Taliban seen the hand over to Canadian forces in 
the area as a possible weak target. As Mao himself wrote, “although guerrilla warfare is the 
warfare of such dispersed units, it is sometimes desirable to concentrate in order to destroy an 
enemy. Thus, the principle of concentration of force against a relatively weaker enemy is 
applicable to guerrilla warfare”.171 It is therefore perfectly acceptable in Maoist terms that the 
Panjwai battle, and the other similar battles which took place in 2006, can be seen as 
‘concentrations of force’ rather than an attempt at a third stage transition. This argument fits 
better with the fact that before 2005, and since 2006, the Taliban has continued guerrilla 
warfare strategies which fit much better with Mao’s second stage, described as “primarily 
guerrilla warfare, supplemented by mobile warfare”.172 Even in 2012, where the Taliban has 
increasingly attempted to stage attacks in urban areas, none have been serious attempts at 
taking and holding these cities, demonstrating that they are still primarily fighting guerrilla 
rather than positional warfare. Despite Khan’s and Giustozzi’s claims, the Taliban is still 
fighting within the realms of a Maoist ‘second stage’, indeed, with the immense superiority of 
the ISAF forces it would be illogical for the Taliban to even attempt a transition to ‘third 
stage’ mobile and positional warfare before the 2014 withdrawal of ISAF. 
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Conclusion 
 Since 2002 the Taliban has directed both its kinetic and information operations in line 
with the two strategic aims of expelling foreign forces from Afghanistan, and restoring the 
Taliban-run Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The majority of the Taliban’s messaging to the 
Afghan public and wider world has, and continues to be, conducted through the vehicle of 
Islam. Although they use Islam as a tool to garner support, through the declaration of a jihad 
for example, it must be understood that to the Taliban it is more than just a tool. After all, the 
word ‘Taliban’ is the plural of the Arabic word talib meaning a student of Islam.173 They 
legitimately see themselves as being religiously obliged to expel the infidel foreign forces, as 
demonstrated by statements at both the leadership level, and from Graeme Smith’s interviews 
with the Taliban insurgents. By conducting their messages through religion, it also allows 
them to avoid the tribal issue at the strategic level, reducing the possibility of alienating 
specific tribal denominations. As the Taliban have developed though they have increasingly 
sought other ways to legitimise the content of the information they were purporting. By 
making statements in the name of the ‘Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’ they attempted to play 
to nationalist sympathies, insinuating that they were a government in exile as a pose to an 
insurgent group. From 2006 onwards they have diversified from solely using traditional 
techniques of shabnamah, word of mouth and poetic diatribes, to using the internet, DVDs, 
mobile phones and magazines to spread their messages of information and intimidation, not 
only through Afghanistan, but also internationally.  
 The development of the Taliban’s kinetic strategies shows that the Quetta shura has 
been more than capable of directing the insurgency to reflect the realities on the ground. They 
have effectively built upon the early gains in their denial and demoralisation strategies, 
increasing their control of rural areas especially. The 2006 concentration of forces is still seen 
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as somewhat of an enigma by analysts. However, it has been shown that a mix of naivety 
from the Taliban, pressure from external sponsors, and an acceptance of high casualty rates 
by the leadership in return for a greater psychological impact on the enemy, are the main 
reasons behind the concentration seen throughout the South in 2006. The regression in 2007 
back to a war of attrition highlights the control that the Taliban leadership possesses over its 
organisation, choosing to adopt a classic approach of occupying areas not held by the enemy. 
Throughout the period of 2007 to 2011 the Taliban continued to trade space for time, 
especially during the 2010/11 ‘surge’ by the US.  The Taliban gathered increasing 
momentum in rural areas, and interdicted NATO and GoA supplies in an attempt to increase 
pressure on their logistical lifelines. The Lisbon Summit announcement of an ISAF 
withdrawal by 2014 only served to signal a lack of resolve to the Taliban. They maintained 
the spread of the insurgency, and by 2012 the Taliban is carrying out operations in every part 
of Afghanistan. Their ability to infiltrate the GoA forces has provided them with numerous 
benefits, including their increased capability to launch coordinated and sophisticated attacks 
in supposedly secure areas of Kabul and Afghanistan.  
 The literature review posed the research question of whether the Taliban gives 
primacy to its information operations over its kinetic strategies. Kilcullen argues that “they 
made propaganda (including ‘armed propaganda’ and intimidation) their main effort”.174 It 
can be argued that the information operations of the Taliban do supersede those of the kinetic 
strategies. For example, the denial and demoralisation approaches rely heavily on shabnamah 
and other intimidation techniques, as well as the actual physical violence in order to be 
effective. Furthermore, most of the kinetic strategies have relied on the coupling propaganda 
effort to attempt to legitimise and justify the violence which the Taliban uses. However, by 
placing the focus on the information operations, Kilcullen highlights the means which the 
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Taliban relies upon, rather than clarifying the ends which they are trying to achieve. The 
reason why the Taliban places such apparent emphasis upon its information operations is 
because of the psychological and political impact it is attempting to attain. All of the 
Taliban’s information operations aim to decrease the legitimacy of its enemies and increase 
that of its own aims. Because they are fighting a war of attrition all of their kinetic strategies 
have had the aim of increasing, or appearing to increase the Taliban’s strength, not only of 
physical capabilities, but also of psychological resolve. The only reason why the information 
operations of the Taliban are superior to the kinetic strategies is because, as Mao states, 
“politics is war without bloodshed while war is politics with bloodshed”.175 The importance 
of the information operations is therefore necessary to constantly show the centrality of the 
political aims of the Taliban, so as not to appear as mindless ‘bloodshed’, but instead as 
‘politics with bloodshed’.  
 Of the four insurgency theories and stratagems discussed, Mao is the most likely to 
have indirectly, or possibly directly, influenced the Taliban. General Barno’s belief that the 
Taliban is fighting a war in line with Hammes’ ‘fourth generation warfare’176 was seen to be 
unpersuasive. The argument that the Taliban is primarily targeting the foreign decision 
makers does not hold up to scrutiny when numerous members of the Taliban leadership have 
vowed that the war will continue after 2014, and the majority of the Taliban’s information 
operations is directed towards the Afghan populace. The Chinese Colonels Liang and 
Xiangsui did offer a better strategy as a tool of analysing the Taliban, however, ‘unrestricted 
warfare’, as they envisioned it, involves a lot more combined aspects to it than simply 
‘guerrilla’ and ‘psychological’ warfare. The historical examples from the nineteenth century 
and the Soviet War demonstrated that large aspects of the Taliban’s style of conflict have 
evolved from these hostilities. Taber’s ‘war of the flea’ does offer some useful sound-bites to 
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discuss the Taliban’s approach with, however, ultimately Mao puts forward the best strategies 
through which to analyse the development of the Taliban. Mao’s work was influential in the 
ISI’s guidance to the mujahideen during the Soviet War, and as such it is highly likely that 
the Taliban leadership of today came into contact, at least indirectly, with his work. The 
Taliban’s decentralisation, equating to its survivability; the distinct appearance of phased 
warfare, from infiltration through to a second phase guerrilla war; and the importance it 
places upon the political and psychological aspects of the war can all be seen as major aspects 
of Mao’s work. It can therefore be seen that a Maoist viewpoint is useful in analysing the 
Taliban’s approach to warfare. This can possibly be used in predicting that the Taliban will 
continue through phased warfare, not entering the third phase until after 2014 at least, as a 
way of achieving their aim of re-establishing the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.  
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